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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act involving the failure of a plan administrator to 
notify a plan participant of the irrevocability of his 
retirement benefit election and joint annuitant designation. 
There are two principal issues on appeal. First, whether the 
plan administrator's failure to disclose the irrevocability of 
the retirement benefit election presents a cognizable ERISA 
claim. Second, if it does, whether the failure to explain the 
irrevocability of the benefit election was a breach of the 
administrator's fiduciary duty. Finding the plan participant 
did not state a cognizable claim under ERISA, the district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the plans and 
the plan administrator. Jordan v. Federal Express Corp., 
914 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Pa. 1996). We will affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
I 
 
In May 1965, airline pilot Captain John Paul Jordan 
commenced flying for Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. and 
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joined its Fixed Pension Plan for Seaboard World Airline 
Pilots. Jordan continued to fly for Flying Tiger Line, Inc. 
after it merged with Seaboard, until his disability 
retirement on June 1, 1989. He also joined the Flying Tiger 
Line, Inc. Variable Annuity Pension Plan for Pilots 
(collectively with the Seaboard Plan, the "plans"). Flying 
Tiger was the plan administrator until 1989, when it 
merged with the Federal Express Corporation. Thereafter 
Federal Express was the plan administrator. The plans are 
"employee benefit plans" under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). 
 
The plans provide retirement benefits for disabled 
participants in the form of a Statutory Joint and Survivor 
Annuity. According to the plans' provisions, Flying Tiger 
was required to furnish participants with information on 
the available retirement options prior to selection. The 
plans provide: 
 
Not less than 90 days prior to a Member's Disability 
Retirement Date . . . the Company shall provide such 
member with a written explanation of the availability of 
an election to waive the Statutory Joint and Survivor 
Annuity, and a written explanation of the terms and 
conditions of the Statutory Benefit and the financial 
effect of an election under Section 8.3 [or 7.3].1 
 
The plans list other retirement benefit options available to 
the participants besides the basic Joint and Survivor 
Annuity.2 Of greater consequence here is the irrevocability 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The "Company" is defined under both plans as "Flying Tiger Line Inc. 
or any successor corporation. The Company shall be the Plan 
Administrator and a named Fiduciary with respect to the Plans." 
 
2. Sections 7.3 of the Variable Annuity Pension Plan (Flying Tiger Plan) 
and 8.3 of the Fixed Pension Plan (Seaboard Plan) provide that a 
disabled participant: 
 
may elect to waive the [Joint and Survivor Annuity Option] at any 
time during the 90 days prior to retirement by filing [a] written 
election with the Company on a form suitable for such purposes. 
Such election shall clearly indicate that the Member is electing to 
receive Retirement benefits in accordance with [the Joint and 
Survivor Option, the Social Security Adjustment Option (only for 
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restriction placed on the participants' election. The plans 
mandate that, "subsequent to a Member's Retirement Date 
the election of [the Joint and Survivor Annuity] Option 
cannot be rescinded nor can the designation of the joint 
annuitant be changed." 
 
In 1988, Jordan commenced a period of long-term sick 
leave. By letter, Flying Tiger informed Jordan that after 
exhaustion of sick leave benefits, he might be eligible for 
disability retirement. To qualify, Jordan had to submit 
documentation of his disqualifying medical condition and 
the Federal Aviation Administration's refusal to issue him a 
flying certificate at least sixty days prior to his retirement. 
After receiving the necessary paperwork, the Benefits 
Department would send Jordan a letter explaining his 
benefit level and retirement options. 
 
On March 14, 1989, Jordan asked Flying Tiger to begin 
processing his disability retirement request. Rather than 
providing the necessary medical and FAA documentation, 
Jordan advised Flying Tiger that the FAA was evaluating 
his certification status. Jordan eventually filed the 
necessary documents on June 3, 1989. 
 
Flying Tiger replied to Jordan's request on June 5, 1989, 
four days after he retired and two days after receipt of the 
FAA's letter denying flight certification and his physician's 
letter describing his debilitating condition. Accompanying 
the plans' response letter were blank copies of a 
"Retirement Election Form" and a "Spousal Consent Form."3 
The benefits letter advised Jordan of his projected monthly 
disability benefits under three of "the most commonly 
elected benefit payment options:" (1) the Straight Life 
Annuity ($6,769.29); (2) the 50% Joint and Survivor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Seaboard Plan), and the Certain and Life Option]. An election under 
this Paragraph may be revoked at any time prior to a Member's 
Retirement Date by filing a further written request in like manner 
that the election be changed . . . [N]o such election shall be valid 
unless a Spousal Consent is filed with the Retirement Board. 
 
3. The Spousal Consent Form was required to be executed by Jordan 
and his wife if he selected the Straight Life Annuity over the Joint and 
Survivor Annuity. This was explained in the letter. 
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Annuity ($6,109.08); and (3) the 100% Joint and Survivor 
Annuity ($5,576.79).4 
 
The letter did not mention that the plans prohibit post- 
retirement changes either to the form of the annuity elected 
or to the beneficiary designation if the Joint and Survivor 
Option were chosen.5 Jordan never requested information 
from the administrator on the revocability of his election, 
nor did he receive, before his retirement election, a copy of 
the terms and conditions of the plans or their Summary 
Plan Descriptions. 
 
Jordan executed and returned the Retirement Election 
Form, selecting the Joint and Survivor 50% Annuity Option 
and designating his wife, Linda Jordan, as his joint 
annuitant. Jordan claims he and his wife were unaware 
that his election was irrevocable. Had they known it was 
irrevocable they would have chosen the Straight Life 
Annuity because of the tenuous state of their marriage. 
 
In September 1989, Jordan received his first disability 
retirement check.6 Soon thereafter Captain Jordan divorced 
Linda Jordan and married Patricia Jordan. Under the 
property settlement, Linda Jordan relinquished all claim to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Even though the plans stipulated that Jordan should receive an 
explanation of the 75% Joint and Survivor Annuity Option and the 
Certain and Life Option in sections 8.3 and 7.3, the letter failed to 
mention them. 
 
5. Jordan was informed that his INVEST pension plan selection was 
revocable as he was entitled to receive additional benefits under the 
terms of the "INVEST" pension plan, and "after a period of five years 
ha[d] elapsed from [his] disability retirement date, [he] may elect a 
different option for benefit payments, including a single lump sum 
payment, based on the current account balance at that time." But this 
was independent and unrelated to his disability retirement election. 
 
6. The benefits letter stated that Jordan's "Disability Retirement would 
commence the first day of the month following or coincident with 
approval of disability, exhaustion of all sick pay and vacation, receipt of 
your FAA Letter of Denial and your request for disability benefits." 
Despite Jordan's failure to submit in a timely fashion the requisite FAA 
certified documents and retirement election form, the pension plans 
agreed to pay him the retirement benefits retroactive as of June 1, 1989. 
Therefore the September 1989 check included payment for the months 
of June, July, and August. 
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Captain Jordan's retirement benefits, including her Joint 
and Survivor beneficiary interest. 
 
In February 1992, Federal Express, the present 
administrator of the plans, denied Jordan's request to 
substitute Patricia Jordan for Linda Jordan as his 
designated joint annuitant because "there are no provisions 
[under the plans] for making changes to the payment form, 
thus your initial election is irrevocable." The letter advised 
him that "your payments will continue as is, with Linda E. 
Jordan as your survivor, in the absence of a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order certified by the court." 
 
Jordan sent Federal Express a copy of a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order issued by the Mercer County 
Court of Common Pleas directing that "all rights and 
interests of Linda E. Jordan [under the plans] . . . are 
hereby terminated and extinguished in their entirety, the 
same as if such rights and interests had never accrued in 
the first instance." He asked the plans either to raise his 
benefit payment to match the monthly amount disbursed 
under the Straight Life Annuity or to recognize Patricia 
Jordan as the beneficiary of his Joint and Survivor 50% 
Annuity. In response, Federal Express canceled Linda 
Jordan's right to receive the benefits under the plans 
without either increasing Jordan's monthly benefits or 
designating Patricia Jordan as the new beneficiary.7 
 
Jordan appealed the denial of survivor benefits to the 
Federal Express Corporation Qualified Employee Benefits 
Committee, which acts as fiduciary for the Federal Express 
pension plan. The Qualified Employee Benefits Committee 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Federal Express contends that several months before Jordan 
requested the change in his retirement option, one of its staff attorneys 
explained to Jordan's domestic relations attorney that the Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order would only extinguish Linda Jordan's rights, 
and not permit Patricia Jordan to receive Linda Jordan's benefits or 
increase Jordan's monthly retirement payments. Federal Express claims 
it suggested to Jordan that he negotiate a settlement with his former 
wife. But Jordan asserts these conversations did not occur and under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 all inferences must be made in his 
favor. In any event, the content of these phone conversations is 
immaterial for purposes of this appeal. 
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denied the appeal but offered to reinstate Jordan's 
previously designated beneficiary (Linda Jordan) if he so 
desired. 
 
In June 1994, Jordan filed this action alleging the plans 
and the administrator violated statutory, regulatory, and 
plan requirements in their administration of his request for 
disability retirement benefits. In his amended complaint, 
Jordan claims he is entitled to revoke his election of his 
former wife Linda Jordan as his joint annuitant because (1) 
he did not receive timely written notice of his benefits; (2) 
he was not informed in advance of his election that he was 
barred from post-retirement changes in his election; (3) he 
did not receive a Summary Plan Description; and (4) the 
plans are being unjustly enriched by "charging" Jordan for 
the Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity through reduced 
pension benefits without his receiving the benefit of having 
a designated joint annuitant. 
 
On cross motions, the district court granted summary 
judgment to Federal Express, holding that Jordan failed to 
state valid claims under ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 
502(a)(3), or federal common law. Specifically the court 
found (1) the alleged violations of the plans' reporting and 
disclosure provisions could not be remedied under ERISA 
§ 502(a)(1)(B), which only permits enforcement of the "terms 
of a plan;" (2) Jordan had failed to allege or put in issue 
any "extraordinary circumstances" required for a § 502(a)(3) 
claim; and (3) a federal common law claim for "unjust 
enrichment" was not available. This appeal followed. 
 
II 
 
This case arose under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and our scope of review 
is plenary. "When we review a grant of summary judgment, 
we apply the same test as the district court should have 
applied initially." Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 
724, 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995). A 
court may grant summary judgment when "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c).8 
 
III  
 
Jordan's cause of action is predicated on the 
administrator's failure to disclose material features of his 
retirement benefit election and his joint annuitant 
designation. The plans and the administrator contend the 
alleged violations are not cognizable under ERISA. Citing 
our prior decisions, they assert there is no § 502(a)(1)(B) 
liability for ERISA disclosure violations and no 
"extraordinary circumstances" that would permit a 
§ 502(a)(3) claim. See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 
F.2d 1155, 1169 (3d Cir. 1990); Ackerman v. Warnaco, Inc., 
55 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 1995). In response, Jordan 
claims there is a valid distinction between disclosure 
violations predicated on the ERISA statute and those based 
solely on the plans' language. The latter he contends are 
cognizable under ERISA. He also maintains his breach of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. An administrator's benefit eligibility determination is reviewed under 
an arbitrary and capricious standard if the plan grants the administrator 
discretionary authority to determine benefits or construe the terms of the 
plan. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); 
Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Taylor v. Continental Group in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 
1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1991). Whether the administrator or fiduciary is 
operating under a possible or actual conflict of interest is a factor which 
must be weighed in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115. But it appears 
that this deferential standard only applies to actions brought under 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and not those brought under§ 502(a)(3). See id., at 108 
("The discussion which follows is limited to the appropriate standard of 
review in § 1132(a)(1)(B) actions challenging denials of benefits based on 
plan interpretations. We express no view as to the appropriate standard 
of review for actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA"); Luby v. 
Teamsters Health, Welfare, and Pension Trust Funds , 944 F.2d 1176, 
1183 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[W]e read the sentence limiting the scope of the 
Firestone Court's discussion as intended to distinguish between remedial 
actions challenging claim denials brought under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and remedial actions based on or brought under other 
ERISA provisions."). Because we hold there is no § 502(a)(1)(B) cause of 
action, we exercise plenary review. 
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fiduciary duty claim should not be evaluated under the 
Ackerman "extraordinary circumstances" test. 
 
A 
 
The district court held that under Hozier, Jordan did not 
have a viable basis under § 502(a)(1)(B) for his disclosure 
claims. Jordan, 914 F. Supp. at 1188 (citing Hozier v. 
Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1990)).9 
Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides a participant with a cause of 
action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of 
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, 
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of 
his plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
 
In Hozier we held that while reporting and disclosure 
violations may cause "substantive harm," they cannot form 
the basis for § 502(a)(1)(B) liability when "the plan defines 
the scope of the entitlements it creates without any 
reference to reporting and disclosure issues." Hozier, 908 
F.2d at 1168. Because the employees in Hozier were only 
entitled to benefits under the plan if they were terminated 
because of a merger, we refused to find a § 502(a)(1)(B) 
cause of action since the plan entitlement provision did not 
create disclosure and reporting obligations. Id. ("[T]he 
determination of whether a particular employee was 
terminated `for the merger,' . . . does not depend on the 
extent to which the employee was made aware that he 
would receive certain severance benefits if terminated `for 
the merger.' "). 
 
In Hozier, we acknowledged that imposing § 502(a)(1)(B) 
liability for statutory disclosure and reporting violations 
might serve the ERISA objective of ensuring that plan 
participants receive adequate information about their plans 
in order to protect their interests. Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1169 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The district court describes Jordan's attempt to state a § 502(a)(1)(B) 
claim as "halfhearted" because "his claims clearly are not based on the 
terms of his retirement plans which, just as clearly, preclude the 
revocation of election or designation of another joint annuitants (sic) he 
seeks." Jordan v. Federal Express Corp., 914 F. Supp. at 1188 (emphasis 
in original). 
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(citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649). But there was also the 
countervailing ERISA consideration "that employees 
themselves are best served by an enforcement regime that 
minimizes employers' expected liability for reporting and 
disclosure violations--and with it, the disincentives against 
creating employee benefit plans in the first place . . . ." Id., 
at 1170. Because Congress chose to provide plan 
participants with a limited set of remedies for statutory 
disclosure violations, we refused to fashion an implied 
remedy which altered ERISA's comprehensive remedial 
scheme. Id., at 1171; see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) ("We are reluctant 
to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such 
evident care as the one in ERISA.").10  
 
The plans here set forth disclosure and reporting 
obligations. Sections 8.2 and 7.2 require the plan 
administrator to provide the participants with "a written 
explanation of the availability of an election to waive the 
Statutory Joint and Survivor Annuity, and a written 
explanation of the terms and conditions of the Statutory 
Benefit and the financial effect of an election under Section 
8.3 [or 7.3]." Prior to waiving their Joint and Survivor 
Annuity and selecting a different retirement benefit option, 
participants were to receive a written explanation 
describing the "terms and conditions" of the Annuity from 
the plan administrator. Even if the plans' disclosure 
violations led Jordan to make an uninformed retirement 
selection, he cannot bring a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim where his 
"plan defines the scope of entitlements it creates without 
any reference to reporting and disclosure issues." Hozier, 
908 F.2d at 1168.11 This is such a case. Therefore, Jordan 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Moreover, we found that Congress provided other viable routes for 
the prosecution of the statutory disclosure violations under § 502(a)(1)(A) 
or § 502(a)(4). 
 
11. In Hozier we stated: 
 
An employee who never receives information about gaps in the 
coverage of his benefits package . . . is unable to make fully 
informed decisions about whether to purchase alternative insurance, 
or even to seek alternative employment. . . . It cannot, however, 
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does not have a cognizable § 502(a)(1)(B) claim against the 
plans or the administrator for their alleged disclosure 
failures.12 
 
B 
 
Jordan also sets forth a § 502(a)(3) claim. Under 
§ 502(a)(3) a plan participant may bring a cause of action: 
 
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, 
or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions 
of this subchapter or the terms of the plan . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 
 
The district court properly dismissed Jordan's § 502(a)(3) 
claim involving the ERISA statutory reporting and 
disclosure violations. We have previously held that 
"substantive remedies are generally not available for 
violations of ERISA's reporting and disclosure 
requirements" except "where the plaintiff can demonstrate 
the presence of `extraordinary circumstances.' " Ackerman 
v. Warnaco, Inc., 55 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 1995). We have 
not provided a rigid definition of "extraordinary 
circumstances." But "extraordinary circumstances" 
generally involve acts of bad faith on the part of the 
employer, attempts to actively conceal a significant change 
in the plan, or commission of fraud. See id. at 125; Kurz v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
plausibly be deemed relevant to a court's construction of "the terms 
of [a] plan" where, as here, the plan defines the scope of the 
entitlements it creates without any reference to reporting and 
disclosure issues." 
 
Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1168. 
 
12. Even if the plans defined the scope of the benefit entitlements with 
reference to disclosure and reporting issues, Jordan would still have to 
demonstrate that the Qualified Employee Benefit Committee's denial of 
his benefit request was arbitrary and capricious in order for him to 
recover under § 502(a)(1)(B), as the plans provide the Committee with the 
requisite discretionary authority. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
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Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1553 (3d Cir. 1996) 
("To support [the extraordinary circumstances] element, we 
have previously required a showing of affirmative acts of 
fraud or similarly inequitable conduct by an employer."); 
Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 238 
(3d Cir. 1994); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 
920-21 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991); 
see also Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp., 74 F.3d 
786, 791 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A] claim for monetary benefits in 
a suit based on technical violations of the notice provisions 
will be awarded only in `exceptional circumstances' 
involving bad faith, intentional concealment or prejudice to 
the employee."). Jordan presented no evidence that Flying 
Tiger acted in bad faith. Based on the record here, Jordan 
failed to establish the requisite "extraordinary 
circumstances," and the district court properly dismissed 
his § 502(a)(3) ERISA disclosure claims. 
 
C 
 
In addition to his § 502(a)(3) ERISA disclosure claims, 
Jordan raised a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the 
plan administrator. The district court dismissed this claim 
because there was insufficient evidence of "extraordinary 
circumstances." In the alternative, the court suggested that 
" `absent a specific participant-initiated inquiry, a plan 
administrator does not have any fiduciary duty to 
determine whether confusion about a plan term or 
condition exists.' " Jordan, 914 F. Supp. at 1192 (quoting 
Switzer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 F.3d 1294, 1299 (5th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that § 502(a)(3) acts as a 
"safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries 
caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere 
adequately remedy." Varity Corp. v. Howe, ___ U.S. ___, 116 
S. Ct. 1065, 1078 (1996).13 This includes breach of 
fiduciary duty. Id. After Varity there is little doubt that 
ERISA provides plan participants an equitable cause of 
action for an administrator's breach of fiduciary duty. This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The district court did not have the benefit of this decision as it was 
decided after the district court granted summary judgment. 
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is the claim that Jordan sets forth in Count II of his 
amended complaint - that the administrator breached its 
fiduciary obligation to inform him of the material aspects of 
his retirement election. 
 
As a threshold matter, we must consider whether the 
district court erred when it required Jordan to satisfy the 
"extraordinary circumstances" test in order to establish a 
§ 502(a)(3) claim for breach of a fiduciary duty. While we 
have required "extraordinary circumstances" to recover 
under ERISA's disclosure and reporting provisions, we have 
not employed the same test for breach of fiduciary duty 
claims. We have previously held: 
 
[S]atisfaction by an employer as plan administrator of 
its statutory disclosure obligations under ERISA does 
not foreclose the possibility that the plan administrator 
may nonetheless breach its fiduciary duty owed plan 
participants to communicate candidly, if the plan 
administrator simultaneously or subsequently makes 
material misrepresentations to those whom the duty of 
loyalty and prudence are owed. 
 
In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 
F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 
1316 (1996); see also Kurz, 96 F.3d at 1552 (treatment of 
the breach of fiduciary duty claim is treated as independent 
and distinct from the equitable estoppel claim based on 
ERISA disclosure violations); Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters 
Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(employee's claim that the employer violated its fiduciary 
duty to inform not analyzed under the "extraordinary 
circumstances" test); Genter v. Acme Scale & Supply Co., 
776 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1985) (same). 
 
It would appear that the Supreme Court has also 
determined that fiduciary duties operate both 
independently from and in conjunction with ERISA's 
specifically delineated requirements. See Varity Corp., 116 
S. Ct. at 1074 ("If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing 
more than activities already controlled by other specific 
legal duties, it would serve no purpose."); see also Central 
States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. 
Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569 n.9 (1985) 
 
                                13 
("ERISA's rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and 
fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit 
plans."). 
 
As we acknowledged in Hozier, one of ERISA's objectives 
was to provide plan participants with greater disclosure 
protection. Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1170. Congress determined 
the prior Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act was 
deficient in that employees were not given sufficient 
information from the plans to protect their interests. H.R. 
Rep. No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4639, 4649; Board of Trustees of the CWA/ITU Negotiated 
Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 143-44 (2d Cir. 
1997) ("Finding that the Disclosure Act was `weak in its 
limited disclosure requirements,' and `inadequate in 
protecting rights and benefits due workers,' . . . Congress 
enacted broader disclosure requirements in ERISA . .. .") 
(citations omitted). To afford the plan participants and 
beneficiaries with greater disclosure protection, Congress 
created reporting and disclosure requirements as well as a 
fiduciary duty framework which "[assures] the equitable 
character of the plans." Central States, 472 U.S. at 570. 
This is reflected in the legislative history. S. Rep. No. 93- 
127 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4863 
("Title V amends the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure 
Act in two significant ways. First, by addition to and 
changes in the reporting requirements designed to disclose 
more . . . information . . . to participants . . . . Second, by 
the addition of a new section setting forth responsibilities 
. . . applicable to persons occupying a fiduciary relationship 
to employee benefit plans."); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5171 ("The conferees 
also improved a number of House and Senate provisions 
which are vital for the protection of the pension rights of 
employees. This includes full disclosure of the features and 
operation of pension plans."). 
 
While the statutory disclosure and reporting 
requirements are clearly set forth in ERISA, see , e.g., 29 
U.S.C. § 1055; 29 U.S.C. § 1025; 29 U.S.C. § 1024, 
Congress chose not to enumerate all the fiduciary duties 
owed. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1070 ("[W]e recognize that these 
fiduciary duties draw much of their content from the 
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common law of trusts . . . . We also recognize, however, 
that trust law does not tell the entire story.") (citations 
omitted). Rather a broader approach was adopted where 
Congress assumed "the courts would interpret the prudent 
man rule (and other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind 
the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans" 
as they develop a federal common law of rights and 
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans. Varity Corp., 116 
S. Ct. at 1070 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5083); see Franchise 
Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983) ("[A] 
body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the 
courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations 
under private welfare and pension plans."); Ream v. Frey, 
107 F.3d 147, 154 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Consequently, the 
Court has indicated that courts must create federal 
common law to flesh out the meaning of ERISA and 
effectuate fully its meaning and purpose."). Because the 
statutory reporting and disclosure requirements and 
remedies were carefully considered and described by 
Congress, we required a showing of "extraordinary 
circumstances" for a participant to receive an equitable 
remedy under § 502(a)(3). See Ackerman, 55 F.3d at 124 
(citing Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 
1319 (3d Cir. 1991)). But for breach of fiduciary duty 
violations, Congress has left it to the courts to "develop a 
federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA- 
regulated plans." Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1070 (quoting 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 110-11); see 
Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 
1499 (9th Cir. 1984) ("But Congress realized that the bare 
terms, however detailed, of these statutory [ERISA] 
provisions would not be sufficient to establish a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme. It accordingly, 
empowered the courts to develop, in the light of reason and 
experience, a body of federal common law governing 
employee benefit plans."). This has been done through the 
employment of trust principles and the creation of federal 
common law. 
 
Furthermore, a review of the case law indicates that the 
fiduciary duty jurisprudence has evolved from a different 
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set of policy concerns from those animating ERISA's 
statutory disclosure requirements. The "extraordinary 
circumstances" limitation set forth in Ackerman flows from 
"Congress's judgment that employees themselves are best 
served by an enforcement regime that minimizes employers' 
expected liability for reporting and disclosure violations-- 
and with it, the disincentives against creating employee 
benefit plans in the first place . . . ." Hozier, 908 F.2d at 
1170. But the basis for fiduciary duty jurisprudence is "to 
protect and strengthen the rights of employees, to enforce 
fiduciary standards, and to encourage the development of 
private retirement plans." In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 
F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 56 (1996). 
Congress believed this protection would best be provided 
through the enforcement of fiduciary duties and the 
provision of information concerning the plans. H.R. Rep. 
No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 
4649. Moreover, Congress has stated that its objectives 
behind adopting the fiduciary duty requirement are "that 
reliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to 
adequately protect the interests of plan participants and 
beneficiaries . . . [and] assuming that the law of trusts is 
applicable, . . . without standards by which a participant 
can measure the fiduciary's conduct he is not equipped to 
safeguard either his own rights or the plan assets." Id. 
 
As a consequence, we evaluate fiduciary duty to inform 
claims differently from violations of ERISA's reporting and 
disclosure requirements. Because "extraordinary 
circumstance" is not required under our fiduciary duty 
analysis, the district court erred when it held there was no 
cognizable § 502(a)(3) claim for a fiduciary breach. 
 
IV 
 
A 
 
In the alternative, the district court suggested that even 
if there were a cognizable claim for breach of fiduciary duty, 
there was no basis to find the administrator breached that 
duty by failing to disclose the irrevocability of Jordan's 
election beforehand.14 Jordan contends the administrator 
violated its duty to disclose by providing him with an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Because the district court held there was no cognizable § 502(a)(3) 
claim, it did not reach the fiduciary breach issue, even though it 
discussed the claims' merits. 
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incomplete explanation of the terms and conditions of his 
election.15 The district court correctly found that neither 
ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code, nor the Treasury 
Regulations specifically require administrators to inform 
plan participants that the retirement benefit election as well 
as the joint annuitant designation is irrevocable during the 
post-retirement period. But this is not dispositive of 
whether the administrator breached its fiduciary duty to 
inform. 
 
It is undisputed that Flying Tiger, as the administrator of 
the plans, was a fiduciary. In fact, the plans define the role 
of administrator as "a named fiduciary." 16 The question here 
is whether the administrator breached its duty to disclose 
even though the participant made no specific inquiry. 
 
On June 5, 1989, Jordan received a four page letter 
which provided information "pertinent to [his] interest in 
Disability Retirement effective June 1, 1989." The letter 
failed to mention that post-retirement changes to the 
participant's retirement plan selection are prohibited. 
Unaware of the revocability restriction, Jordan selected the 
50% Joint and Survivor Annuity and designated his wife 
Linda Jordan as the beneficiary, even though they had 
marital difficulties at the time. Jordan brought this action, 
in part claiming that Flying Tiger maintained a duty to 
inform him of the irrevocability of his decision, and its 
failure to do so constitutes a breach of its fiduciary duties 
under ERISA. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Under the plans' disclosure requirements found in § 7.2 and § 8.2, 
the administrator was required to provide the participants in advance of 
their retirement selection with a "written explanation of the availability 
of an election to waive the Statutory Joint and Survivor Annuity, and a 
written explanation of the terms and conditions of the Statutory Benefit 
and the financial effect of an election under 8.3[or 7.3]." 
 
16. "There are three ways to acquire fiduciary status under ERISA: (1) 
being named as the fiduciary in the instrument establishing the 
employee benefit plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2); (2) being named as a 
fiduciary pursuant to a procedure specified in the plan instrument, . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38); and (3) being a fiduciary 
under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) . . . ." Glaziers & 
Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Securities, 
Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1179 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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ERISA defines the scope of a fiduciary's duty as follows: 
 
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to 
a plan in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and -- 
 
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
 
(i) providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries; and 
 
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administerin g 
the plan; 
 
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
found that "Congress intended by § 404(a) to incorporate 
the fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA, and . . . 
that fiduciaries owe strict duties running directly to 
beneficiaries in the administration and payment of trust 
benefits." Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 
U.S. 134, 152-53 (1985); Ream, 107 F.3d at 153 ("A 
fiduciary's duties under ERISA are based both on ERISA, 
particularly the prudent person standard as set forth in 
ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104, and on the common law of 
trusts."); In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d 
Cir. 1996) ("We also bear in mind that Congress has 
instructed that section 1104 `in essence, codifies and 
makes applicable to . . . fiduciaries certain principles 
developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.' ") (quoting 
S. Rep. No. 93-127 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4838, 4863). 
 
Through the application of trust principles, we have held 
that fiduciaries have a duty to inform which "entails not 
only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an 
affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that 
silence might be harmful." Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300.17 But "a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides: 
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fiduciary has a legal duty to disclose to the beneficiary only 
those material facts known to the fiduciary but unknown to 
the beneficiary, which the beneficiary must know for its 
own protection." Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1182; see also Bixler, 
12 F.3d at 1300 ("[T]he duty to disclose material 
information `is the core of a fiduciary's responsibility.' ") 
(quoting Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 919 F.2d 
747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The inquiry here is whether the 
administrator failed to inform Jordan of a material aspect of 
his upcoming benefit election. See In re Unisys, 57 F.3d at 
1265 n.15 ("An ERISA fiduciary does have . . .`a duty to 
communicate complete and accurate information about a 
beneficiary's status.' ") (quoting Eddy, 919 F.2d at 751). 
 
In Unisys we held a misrepresentation rises to a material 
level if "there is a substantial likelihood that it would 
mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately 
informed retirement decision." In re Unisys, 57 F.3d at 1264.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
d. Duty in the absence of a request by the beneficiary. Ordinarily 
the trustee is not under a duty to the beneficiary to furnish 
information to him in the absence of a request for such information. 
. . . In dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account, 
however, he is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary all 
material facts in connection with the transaction which the trustee 
knows or should know. . . . Even if the trustee is not dealing with 
the beneficiary on the trustee's own account, he is under a duty to 
communicate to the beneficiary material facts affecting the interest 
of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know 
and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection in 
dealing with a third person. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173, comment d (1959) "(cited in, 
Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300). 
 
18. Similar tests for materiality have been adopted in other contexts. A 
representation is material for purposes of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act if it "had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of 
. . ." a party. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988). Also "an 
omitted fact is material [for purposes of the securities law] if there is a 
`substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact 
would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the 
reasonable shareholder.' " Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 280 
n.11 (3d Cir.) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 
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An omission may rise to a material level for the same 
reason. Irrevocability is arguably of material importance. 
We need not take judicial notice of the national divorce rate 
to hold that the non-disclosure of the irrevocability of a 
joint annuitant's designation may be a material omission 
on the part of an administrator. Plan participants might 
reasonably expect that a written explanation of a 
Retirement Benefit would inform them of the permanence of 
their benefit election post-retirement. 
 
It is apparent why a participant might consider 
irrevocability material. According to the Jordans' affidavits, 
both Linda Jordan and Captain Jordan would have chosen 
to forego the Joint and Survivor benefit package in favor of 
the Straight Life Annuity option if they had known of the 
irrevocability of the selection. In fact, only a few months 
after his election they divorced and reached a settlement 
where Linda Jordan relinquished all entitlement to her 
beneficiary interest. According to Jordan, this unrealized 
expectation resulted in his relying on an incomplete written 
explanation and making an uninformed benefit selection. 
 
Barring post-retirement changes to a participant's 
election or joint annuitant designation is justified. This 
policy is necessary to avoid manipulation of annuity 
disbursements through the selection of a Straight Life 
Annuity or the designation of a younger joint annuitant 
when the original joint annuitant's life expectancy 
diminishes. But there is an issue of fact here whether the 
plan administrator breached its duty to inform Jordan in 
its June 5th letter of the existence of such a restriction 
before he made his irrevocable election. 
 
We recognize that participants have a duty to inform 
themselves of the details provided in their plans, Genter v. 
Acme Scale & Supply Co., 776 F.2d 1180, 1185 (3d Cir. 
1985), and that the irrevocability restriction was contained 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
449 (1976)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992). Additionally, Black's Law 
Dictionary defines a "Material representation" as something that "relates 
to a matter upon which plaintiff could be expected to rely in determining 
to engage in the conduct in question." Black's Law Dictionary at 977 (6th 
ed. 1990). 
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in Jordan's plans. But it is uncontested that Jordan did not 
receive copies of the plans or their Summary Plan 
Descriptions before his election. We also recognize that 
Jordan never requested information on irrevocability. The 
district court held this potentially dispositive since " `absent 
a specific participant-initiated inquiry, a plan administrator 
does not have any fiduciary duty to determine whether 
confusion about a plan term or condition exists. It is only 
after the plan administrator does receive an inquiry that it 
has a fiduciary obligation to respond promptly and 
adequately in a way that is not misleading.' " Jordan, 914 
F. Supp. at 1192 (quoting Switzer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
52 F.3d 1294, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 
But in prior cases, we have held a specific request for 
information is not necessarily a prerequisite forfinding a 
fiduciary breach to inform. As we held in Glaziers, "it is 
clear that circumstances known to the fiduciary can give 
rise to this affirmative obligation [to inform] even absent a 
request by the beneficiary." Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1181. 
Moreover, in Bixler we held that "while the beneficiary may, 
at times, bear a burden of informing the fiduciary of her 
material circumstance, the fiduciary's obligations will not 
be excused merely because she failed to comprehend or ask 
about a technical aspect of the plan." Bixler, 12 F.3d at 
1300. Here, we do not believe Jordan's failure to inquire is 
fatal to his claim. Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1181 ("Indeed, 
absent such information, the beneficiary may have no 
reason to suspect that it should make inquiry into what 
may appear to be a routine matter."). Under the terms of 
the plans, the administrator was obligated to provide all 
participants, before they made their retirement selection, 
with a written explanation of the annuity, which contained 
"information pertinent to [their] interest in Disability 
Retirement." Letter from Flying Tiger to Jordan of 6/5/89 
at 1. Although the eighty-one page Flying Tiger Plan and 
the fifty-one page Seaboard Plan described the irrevocability 
of the participant's retirement election post-retirement, the 
June 5th letter describing his retirement options contained 
no reference to irrevocability. Interestingly, the June 5th 
letter explicitly discussed Jordan's ability to revoke his 
INVEST pension plan election. And before retirement, 
Jordan was permitted to freely change his retirement plan 
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option. But once Jordan retired, his annuity election 
became irrevocable. The letter describing his retirement 
options did not notify him of this crucial difference. 
Because of Jordan's previous experience with changing his 
retirement options, the explicit reference to his ability to 
revoke his INVEST plan selection, and the administrator's 
failure to disclose the irrevocability of his retirement 
annuity selection in the June 5th letter, Jordan was not 
put on notice that a change in revocability would result 
upon retirement. For these reasons, we do not believe 
Jordan's failure to inquire bars his claim. 
 
There still is an issue of fact whether the administrator's 
failure to describe the irrevocability of Jordan's retirement 
selection constituted a material omission and a breach of 
its duty to exercise the "care, skill, prudence and diligence" 
as required under ERISA.19 This question is left to the fact 
finder. 
 
If Jordan is entitled to relief, he may recover back 
benefits, recision of his retirement selection, and the 
opportunity to select a new disability retirement option. See 
In re Unisys, 57 F.3d at 1269. 
 
B 
 
Jordan also contends the written explanation was 
untimely as he did not receive it at least "ninety (90) days 
prior to [his] Disability Retirement Date." It appears that 
the administrator violated the plans' provision requiring at 
least a ninety day review period. Jordan retired on June 1, 
1989 and received his written explanation on June 5, 1989. 
But we find as a matter of law that this does not constitute 
a breach of the administrator's fiduciary duty. Before the 
plans were to supply Jordan with the retirement election 
information, he was required to provide the administrator, 
at least sixty days prior to his projected retirement date, 
with a written request for disability retirement, a letter from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. "Summary judgment on `the question of materiality' is appropriate 
only if `reasonable minds cannot differ.' " Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir.) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1020 (1993). 
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the FAA medical examiner which documented his 
disqualifying medical condition, and supporting medical 
documentation. Jordan failed to timely submit these 
documents. Rather he sent the administrator a letter which 
merely stated that the FAA was currently reviewing his 
disability application. 
 
The plan administrator would not have exercised its 
fiduciary duties with the "care, skill, prudence and 
diligence" of a "prudent man" if it started to process 
Jordan's retirement application and sent him the 
informational letter before it was assured that Jordan 
qualified for disability retirement. It was not until June 3, 
1989 that the Administrator received the documents 
establishing Jordan's disability status. Once this 
information was received, the administrator immediately 
sent out the informational letter and selection forms. Under 
the circumstances, the administrator did not breach its 
fiduciary duty by sending Jordan the informational letter 
on June 5, 1989.20 
 
C 
 
The administrator's failure to provide Jordan with all of 
the required retirement alternatives in the benefits letter 
was not raised before the district court. For this reason, we 
will not reach this issue. Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 
840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) ("This Court has consistently held 
that it will not consider issues that are raised for the first 
time on appeal."); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United 
States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976) (same). 
 
D 
 
Jordan also asserts a federal common law claim for 
unjust enrichment. We have held that federal common law 
causes of action are warranted when they are "necessary to 
fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory 
pattern enacted in the large by Congress." Plucinski v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. As stated previously, Jordan's timeliness claim based on ERISA's 
disclosure requirements is not cognizable. Ackerman, 55 F.3d 117 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
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I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 
1989). Furthermore, we have previously held "that the 
district courts should not easily fashion additional ERISA 
claims . . . under the guise of federal common law." Curcio 
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 239 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 
312 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Where Congress has established an 
extensive regulatory network and has expressly announced 
its intention to occupy the field, federal courts will not 
lightly create additional rights under the rubric of federal 
common law."); see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) ("The six carefully 
integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of 
the statute as finally enacted . . . provide strong evidence 
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies 
that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.") (emphasis in 
original). Because Jordan brought a claim under § 502(a)(3), 
the district court correctly dismissed his federal common 
law "unjust enrichment" claim because it was not needed to 
"fill in interstices of ERISA." 
 
E 
 
Finally, Jordan presents a claim for damages based on 
the plans' failure to provide Jordan with a Summary Plan 
Description pursuant to ERISA sections 102(a)(1) and 
104(b)(1). This ERISA statutory claim is not cognizable 
under § 502(a)(1)(B) or § 502(a)(3). Hozier, 908 F.2d 1155; 
see also Ackerman, 55 F.3d 117. We will affirm the district 
court's dismissal. 
 
V 
 
In conclusion, we hold that Jordan's § 502(a)(3) breach of 
fiduciary duty claim alleging failure of the administrator to 
inform him of the irrevocability of his benefit selection is 
cognizable under ERISA. We believe there is a factual issue 
which precludes summary judgment - whether the 
administrator's failure to mention irrevocability in its June 
5, 1989 letter breached its fiduciary duty. We will affirm the 
dismissal of the timeliness, unjust enrichment, and 
summary plan description claims. We will also affirm the 
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dismissal of the other ERISA statutory and regulatory 
claims. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm in part, reverse 
in part and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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